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11.1 Introduction
Apparel is the archetypal labor-intensive footloose manufacturing in-
dustry. It is also very distorted by protection. This protection is unusually
opaque, as world trade in textiles and apparel is heavily inﬂuenced by a
complex system of bilateral quotas called the Multiﬁber Arrangement
(MFA). Our goal in this paper is to improve our understanding of the ex-
tent and eﬀects of the MFA, making use of a unique data set on product-
level U.S. import quotas. We combine the quota data with very detailed
data on trade ﬂows, transport costs, and tariﬀs, and we focus on the East
Asian exporters who have traditionally supplied the bulk of U.S. apparel
imports. Our ﬁndings include the following:
• The MFA constrains exporters in East Asia, although many exports
are not subject to binding quotas, especially those from China and
Hong Kong.
• Trade liberalization during the 1990s helped East Asian exporters to
expand their sales to the United States, but hurt them relative to their
competitors in Mexico and Asia.
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.• Technological change, which led to an increased demand for timely
delivery, also hurt East Asia relative to Mexico and the Caribbean.
• The MFA raised import prices and transferred many billions of dol-
lars in quota rents to holders of quota licenses in East Asia and else-
where.
11.2 U.S. Trade Policy in Apparel
A variety of restrictions have long aﬀected trade in textile and apparel
products. As early as the 1950s, the United States adopted policies in-
tended to limit the imports of such products. One of the broadest policies,
however, became eﬀective in 1974. The MFA established a system of quo-
tas, negotiated bilaterally, that limited imports of textile and apparel prod-
ucts.
Recently, eﬀorts have been made to liberalize trade in apparel. Partici-
pants in the Uruguay Round of trade talks under the WTO agreed to phase
out the MFA beginning in 1995. The MFA was replaced by the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which put in place a system for gradual
elimination of quantitative restrictions. The ATC incorporated a series of
stages, with phaseouts occurring at the beginning of 1995, 1998, 2002, and
2005, at which time all remaining quotas will be eliminated. Remaining
quotas are progressively enlarged, using agreed-to increasing growth rates.
The agreement also established a special safeguard mechanism for protec-
tion against surges and a monitoring body to supervise implementation.
The United States has participated in the MFA phaseout process. Note,
however, that when the ﬁrst stage of quota elimination began in 1995, the
United States was one of only four World Trade Organization (WTO)
members that still maintained import restrictions under the MFA.1
When the MFA ﬁrst came into eﬀect, China was not a member of the
WTO, so it was not a part of the initial MFA phaseout process. However,
upon accession to the WTO at the end of 2001, China became eligible for
participation in the MFA quota elimination process. Thus, the United
States generally implemented the ﬁrst three stages of “integration” (i.e.,
into the MFA quota liberalization program) for China in the ﬁrst part of
2002.2 When it joined the WTO, China also agreed to a special safeguard
on its textile and apparel exports. Under this safeguard mechanism, if a
WTO member felt that textile and apparel imports from China threatened
to “impede the orderly development of trade in these products,” it could re-
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1. According to the WTO, the other countries were Canada, the European Community
(EC) and Norway. Many other WTO Members maintained the right to use the transitional
safeguard mechanism in the ATC. Only nine members were deemed to have integrated 100
percent at the outset (WTO 2003). For example, see OTEXA (2003b).
2. See Federal Register (2001, 2002), WTO (2001), and United States International Trade
Commission (2004).quest that China limit its exports to that country, generally for no more
than one year. If consultations did not lead to a diﬀerent solution, China
would agree to hold its exports of the given product “to a level no greater
than 7.5 per cent (6 per cent for wool product categories) above the amount
entered during the ﬁrst 12 months of the most recent 14 months preceding
the month in which the request for consultations was made” (WTO 2001,
46–47).3 This safeguard mechanism will remain in place until December
31, 2008. As a result, although MFA quotas will generally be eliminated by
January 1, 2005, their growth in imports from China could remain limited,
depending on developments with regard to this special safeguard mecha-
nism.
In addition to agreeing to eliminate quantitative restrictions, the United
States agreed to reduce its tariﬀs on textile and apparel products. Accord-
ing to the Oﬃce of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA, a division of the U.S.
Commerce Department that administers the United States’s MFA quotas),
tariﬀs on textile and apparel products were slated to decline from a trade
weighted average of 17.2 percent ad valorem in 1994 to a trade weighted
average of 15.2 percent ad valorem in 2004. The majority of these reduc-
tions were to be phased in over the ten years (see OTEXA 1995).
Regional liberalization eﬀorts have also aﬀected the degree to which
quantitative restrictions constrain trade. The main regional agreements
aﬀecting the period that we examine are the Caribbean Basin Initiative/
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBI/CBERA) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4The CBI/CBERA programs,
initially enacted in the mid-1980s, provided preferential treatment for im-
ports from twenty-four countries in that region.5 While apparel products
are generally not eligible for CBI/CBERA beneﬁts, apparel assembled in
the Caribbean Basin using U.S.-origin components receives preferential
treatment in the form of easing of quotas and/or reduced duties. While
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3. Note that at the end of 2003 the United States used this safeguard mechanism for imports
from China of three categories of imports: knit fabric, cotton and man-made ﬁber brassieres,
and cotton and man-made ﬁber dressing gowns.
4. The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) was another program that provided beneﬁts
that, in some cases, applied to trade in apparel. The ATPA was signed into law on December
4, 1991 but excluded many apparel products. More speciﬁcally, ineligible products included,
“textile and apparel items subject to textile agreements on the date that the ATPA took eﬀect”
(Shelburne and Chao 2002, 43). In 1996, of wearing apparel and accessories (Standard and
Industrial Classiﬁcation [SIC] 1987-based product group 238) imports from ATPA countries,
$1.2 million of $6.8 million entered duty-free, and in 1997 $1.2 million out of $15 million en-
tered duty-free. In 1995, ATPA countries also became eligible for 9802 beneﬁts. Assembled
apparel items ($185 million with 47 percent U.S.-content value) accounted for almost 95 per-
cent of the value of U.S. imports from ATPA beneﬁciaries under Harmonized TariﬀSchedule
(HTS) item 9802.00.80 in 2001; the other industrial group with appreciable amounts was tex-
tile mill products ($10 million with 54 percent U.S.-content value). See Shelburne and Chao
(2002).
5. Note that beneﬁts were subject to the countries satisfying certain conditions.these trade preferences clearly aﬀected imports from this region, there
were no major changes to the policy over the time period that we examine.
Prior to the enactment of NAFTA in 1994, Mexico did not receive trade
preferences on apparel exports commensurate with those available to the
CBI countries (Pregelj 2000). The enactment of NAFTA, however, signiﬁ-
cantly changed the relative position of CBI countries vis-à-vis Mexico.
Many apparel articles not eligible for beneﬁts under CBI/CBERA were
scheduled for a gradual reduction in duties under NAFTA. Further, provi-
sions for production-sharing arrangements with Mexico became more ad-
vantageous than those for production sharing with CBI countries. (This
change in the relative position of Mexico versus the CBI countries can be
seen in the change in tariﬀ incidence by region between 1990 and 1998, as
shown in ﬁgures 11.5 and 11.6.)
The diﬀerential eﬀect of these preferential agreements on Mexico/CBI
versus Asia should be kept in mind. However, there were generally no sig-
niﬁcant changes in the treatment of CBI countries over this time so that
NAFTA is the more important element to consider. Further, in the section
in which we discuss changes in patterns of imports from Asia versus Mex-
ico/CBI, the tariﬀ and quota data should capture the eﬀects of the prefer-
ential agreements.
11.3 The Extent of Protection in Apparel
Given this elaborate structure of trade restrictions, it is not surprising
that textiles and apparel have often been characterized as the “bad boy” of
broader eﬀorts to liberalize trade ﬂows. For example, Michael Finger and
Ann Harrison (1996, 48) write, “Although textiles and apparel account for
less than 2 percent of total employment in the U.S. economy, protecting
them against import competition accounts for 83 percent of the net cost to
the U.S. economy of all import restrictions.”
U.S. imports of apparel encounter both tariﬀ and quota protection at
the border. Data on tariﬀ rates is fairly readily available. We utilize trade
data on apparel imports, tariﬀs, and transport costs from CD-ROMS pur-
chased from the U.S. Department of Commerce. These data are reported
at the ten-digit Harmonized TariﬀSchedule (HTS) level, which is the ﬁnest
level of disaggregation available. Among other things, the data include in-
formation on import values, import quantities, tariﬀs, transport costs, and
source country.
The data suggest a high level of protection in this sector, at least at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. Figure 11.1shows histograms, weighted by import val-
ues, of tariﬀ rates across all sources of apparel imports. In 1990 and 1991,
about half of U.S. imports paid tariﬀs of over 16 percent, and virtually none
came in duty-free. There has been some liberalization since the early 1990s.
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cent entered nearly duty-free (with tariﬀs of less than 2 percent).
Information on quota incidence is more diﬃcult to obtain than data on
tariﬀs. As a result, analysis evaluating the extent to which the quota system
has restricted imports to the United States has been somewhat limited.
Information on U.S. textile and apparel quotas is maintained by OTEXA
within the U.S. Department of Commerce. Working with OTEXA, we have
assembled a comprehensive product-level time series on the U.S. MFA pro-
gram. Quota levels vary by product, year, and trading partner. We obtained
records on all apparel quotas from 1990 to 1998. The Oﬃce of Textiles and
Apparel uses their own import classiﬁcation system to administer the
MFA, which has no simple relationship to any other U.S. or international
system of reporting trade data. The product categories are broken down
by type of ﬁber (cotton, wool, silk, man-made, and other) and are fairly
broad: categories include “dresses,” “sweaters,” “underwear,” and so on.
Using this data, we are able to examine the extent to which quotas have re-
stricted imports of apparel and textile.
The most important indicator of a quota’s restrictiveness is its “ﬁll rate,”
deﬁned as the percentage of a quota that is used. Fill rates that are much
less than 100 percent suggest that the quota is not binding, while higher ﬁll
rates indicate that the quota indeed keeps imports below what they would
otherwise be. Table 11A.1 summarizes quota incidence in 1991 and 1998
by commodity.
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Fig. 11.1 Distribution of tariﬀ rates, 1990–1998
Notes: The histogram is weighted by import values and includes values     35 percent, 98.5
percent of data. This histogram illustrates the incidence of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates weighted
by the value of imports. The vertical axis measures the share of total imports, and the height
of the bars gives the share of imports in a particular range of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates.Figure 11.2 illustrates the incidence of quotas. It shows histograms of
quota ﬁll rates across all sources of apparel imports, weighted by import val-
ues, for each of the years in the sample. If we deﬁne a binding quota as one
with a ﬁll rate of 90 percent or above, the ﬁgure shows that about 40 percent
of U.S. apparel imports came in under binding quotas throughout the
1990s.6 One question of interest is whether the gradual liberalization under
the WTO has aﬀected the incidence of quotas. Many of the required
changes in quota restrictions have been delayed until the very last phaseout
period. In the case of the United States, nearly 50 percent of the planned
phaseouts will not occur until the ﬁnal tranche on January 1, 2005.7 In fact,
according to the 1998 review of the implementation of the agreement, a
number of countries complained that a vast majority of liberalization in
terms of the value of trade would indeed not occur until the ﬁnal phases of
the program (see WTO 1998). This slow progress on liberalization is re-
ﬂected in the fact that there has been little change in the proportion of trade
coming in under binding quotas during this period. Nevertheless, the fact
that much of the trade is not aﬀected by a binding quota suggests that even
the current restrictions are not as onerous as might have been expected.
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Fig. 11.2 Distribution of quota ﬁll rates, 1990–1998
Notes: The histogram is weighted by import values. This histogram illustrates the incidence
of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates weighted by the value of imports. The vertical axis measures the
share of total imports, and the height of the bars gives the share of imports in a particular
range of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates.
6. Industry experts deﬁne a quota as restrictive or “constraining” if it is ﬁlled to between 85
and 90 percent. Although this level is still below the maximum allowed export limit, com-
plexities in the quota management system (including complex aggregates) can make it diﬃ-
cult to completely ﬁll a quota (USITC 2002). The European Union (EU) deﬁnes quotas 95
percent ﬁlled as constraining. See USITC (2002).
7. See OTEXA (2003a). This is consistent with the liberalization requirements of the ATC.Figures 11.1 and 11.2 cover all sources of U.S. apparel imports and are
not necessarily indicative of the barriers facing East Asian exporters. Fig-
ure 11.3 shows the value of apparel imports from East Asia. China and
Hong Kong are the largest exporters of both constrained and uncon-
strained imports, while the smaller exporters (Thailand, Singapore, Indo-
nesia, and the Philippines) seem to have their exports very tightly capped
by MFA quotas.
Table 11.1 shows the extent to which quotas have applied to U.S. im-
ports, and it conﬁrms the visual impression of ﬁgure 11.2: the share of U.S.
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Fig. 11.3 U.S. apparel imports from East Asia, 1990–1998
Table 11.1 U.S. apparel imports from all sources, percent of total
Unrestricted Nonbinding quota Binding quota
1990 39 20 41
1991 27 21 52
1992 27 22 51
1993 30 27 42
1994 30 23 47
1995 27 37 36
1996 27 41 32
1997 28 27 45
1998 33 23 44
Notes: Table reports the share of total imports subject to diﬀerent levels of quotas. Unre-
stricted imports face no quota. A nonbinding quota is deﬁned as having a ﬁll rate between 0
and 90, and binding quotas have ﬁll rates of at least 90 percent.imports coming in under a binding quota did not change much during the
1990s. It is important to remember that the 1990s were a time of booming
demand in the United States, so it may be that expanding quota limits
simply kept pace with growing demand, leaving the equilibrium amount of
quota-constrained trade roughly equal. Indeed, the import-weighted aver-
age binding quota grew by 10 percent per year over the period. Table 11.2
illustrates that there was substantial liberalization for the major East Asian
exporters, with China and Hong Kong seeing their quota-constrained ex-
ports fall by more than 15 percentage points as a share of their total ex-
ports, while Taiwan’s quota-constrained share fell by 25 percentage points.
By contrast, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea all found
themselves more tightly constrained in 1998 than they were in 1991.
Figures 11.2 and 11.3 and tables 11.1 and 11.2 establish that the aggre-
gate U.S. quota coverage didn’t change much, while the big East Asian ex-
porters saw some liberalization. How is this possible? The answer is Mex-
ico and the Caribbean. Figure 11.4 shows that the 1990s saw a substantial
shift in apparel import market share away from Asia and toward Mexico
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The Philippines 58 70
China 74 57
Korea 28 65
Hong Kong 73 57
Taiwan 83 58
Fig. 11.4 Share of U.S. apparel imports, 1990–1998and the Caribbean. This was at least partly due to tariﬀ liberalization that
favors these countries close to the United States, as seen in ﬁgures 11.5 and
11.6. However, as tariﬀs were liberalized for Mexico and the Caribbean,
Mexico became more constrained by quotas, as illustrated in ﬁgures 11.7
and 11.8.
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Fig. 11.5 Tariﬀ incidence by region, 1991
Notes: The histogram is weighted by import values and includes values     35 percent, 98.5
percent of data. This histogram illustrates the incidence of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates weighted
by the value of imports. The vertical axis measures the share of total imports, and the height
of the bars gives the share of imports in a particular range of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates.
Fig. 11.6 Tariﬀ incidence by region, 1998
Notes: The histogram is weighted by import values and includes values     35 percent, 98.5
percent of data. This histogram illustrates the incidence of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates weighted
by the value of imports. The vertical axis measures the share of total imports, and the height
of the bars gives the share of imports in a particular range of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates.376 Carolyn L. Evans and James Harrigan
Fig. 11.7 Quota incidence by region, 1991
Notes: The histogram is weighted by import values. This histogram illustrates the incidence
of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates weighted by the value of imports. The vertical axis measures the
share of total imports, and the height of the bars gives the share of imports in a particular
range of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates.
Fig. 11.8 Quota incidence by region, 1998
Notes: The histogram is weighted by import values. This histogram illustrates the incidence
of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates weighted by the value of imports. The vertical axis measures the
share of total imports, and the height of the bars gives the share of imports in a particular
range of tariﬀs or quota ﬁll rates.
11.4 Trade and the Demand for Timeliness
Trade policy in the form of NAFTA and the CBI is certainly part of the
reason for the market share shifts seen in ﬁgure 11.4. Another explanation,
discussed in detail in Evans and Harrigan (2004), is that an increased de-
mand for timeliness (by which we mean a short and reliable lag between or-der and delivery) has aﬀected the pattern of trade. In apparel retailing, the
demand for timely delivery comes from ﬂuctuations in demand and varies
by product category. To measure the demand for timeliness, we collected
data from a major U.S. department store chain on the percentage of vari-
ous apparel categories that are subject to “rapid replenishment,” that is,
which are reordered continuously throughout the selling season. This busi-
ness strategy was almost unknown in 1990 but was in widespread use by the
end of the decade (see Abernathy et al. 1999). Since rapid delivery is most
proﬁtable from nearby locations, our hypothesis is that imports of prod-
ucts where rapid replenishment is important have grown disproportion-
ately from countries near the United States.
A possible substitute for proximity is airfreight: imports that are shipped
by air from distant countries can arrive just as quickly as products shipped
by sea or land from nearby countries. Air freight has gotten much cheaper
over time (see Hummels 2001), but it remains far more expensive than
other modes, suggesting that only products that have a high ratio of value
to weight (“light” products) can proﬁtably be shipped by air. If airfreight is
a substitute for proximity, and if airfreight is only proﬁtable for light prod-
ucts, then we should see that light products have increasingly been sourced
from countries far from the United States.
To investigate this hypothesis, we estimated the following equation on a
single long-time diﬀerence from 1991 to 1998:
(1)  mic    i    c        ic    1ridc    2vicdc,
where the  s are product- and country-ﬁxed eﬀects and
 mic  growth in imports in product i from country c.
  ic  change in ad valorem trade barriers.
ri  percent of products in category i subject to rapid replenishment.
dc  indicator equal to 1 for countries close to the United States (Mex-
ico, Caribbean, Canada).
vic  value-to-weight ratio of product i from country c in last year of
sample.
Larger values of vic correspond to lighter products.
The hypotheses are that  1   0 and  2   0 would support our hypothesis:
products where replenishment is important and products that are heavy
grew more rapidly from nearby countries. We test this hypothesis using
only observations where quotas were not binding, and the results are given
in table 11.3(which is closely related to results in Evans and Harrigan 2004;
see that paper for more details, data description, and sensitivity analysis).
The proximity-replenishment eﬀect  1 is about one, with a t-statistic of 3.
How big is this eﬀect? Because the range of the replenishment variable is
between 0 and 67 percent, an estimated   of 1.04 implies that high-
replenishment products from nearby countries grew 1.04   67   70 per-
centage points faster than otherwise. This is a big eﬀect: it is more than 2.5
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as fast as median growth. For products where replenishment is less impor-
tant, with a replenishment percentage of 25 percent, the estimates still im-
ply a big proximity eﬀect, with imports growing 26 percentage points faster
from nearby countries than more remote sources. The replenishment-
proximity eﬀect is also large relative to the eﬀects of protection: the esti-
mated parameters imply that, for high-replenishment products, proximity
to the United States is equivalent to a 53 percentage point reduction in tar-
iﬀs, while for goods with a replenishment percentage of 25 percent, prox-
imity is equivalent to a 20 percentage point tariﬀ reduction.
The eﬀect of weight is also large. The standard deviation of the value-
weight ratio is 230; multiplying this by the estimated  2means that imports
of light products grew –0.132   230   30 percentage points more slowly
from nearby than from faraway countries.
11.5 The Eﬀect of Protection on Import Prices
We have shown that both trade policy and geography have had an im-
portant eﬀect on the pattern and volume of trade in apparel. We now turn
to the eﬀect of U.S. trade policy on the prices of apparel imports. With two
or more competing exporters, a key parameter is the degree of substi-
tutability in the importer’s demand between the products of the diﬀerent ex-
porters. We consider a few simple cases here, as a guide to empirical work.
The simplest model that is relevant to the MFA is one where there are
two exporters, only one of whom faces a binding quota and whose exports
are perfect substitutes in the importer’s demand. The situation is illustrated
in ﬁgure 11.9.
The import demand curve facing two exporting countries A and B is
given by m( p). A has lower costs c A   cB, so that in the absence of trade re-
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Table 11.3 Import growth 1991–1998
Variable Estimate
Proximity   replenishment 0.9968
3.00




Notes: All regressions include country and product ﬁxed eﬀects. Sample is observations not
constrained by quotas (N   2,753). t-statistics in italics. Dependent variable is bounded im-
port growth between 1991 and 1998:


























 strictions all imports would be from A. However, a quota has been placed
on imports from A, mA   Q. As a result, the world price is determined by
cost in B, p   cB, with exporters in A earning a rent per unit equal to the
cost diﬀerence.8 The quota binds, with mA   Q and mB   m(cB) – Q.
An interesting thing about this little model is that it implies that, across
a group of exporting countries, there need be no relationship between unit
value and a binding quota: the two countries charge the same price even
though one is bound by a quota and the other is not. Furthermore, any
change in the level of the quota will have no eﬀect on price, as long as Q  
m(cB); beyond that point, B’s market share goes to zero and any further
quota relaxation leads to a fall in price as the equilibrium moves down the
demand curve.
What if imports from A and B are imperfect substitutes? This case is il-
lustrated in the two panels of ﬁgure 11.10. A relaxation of the quota con-
straint on A leads to lower prices on imports from A, which in turn shifts
the demand curve facing exporters in B. Depending on the elasticities of
demand in the two markets, and the elasticity of supply in B, relative prices
of A and B exports can rise, fall, or stay the same. A useful benchmark is
one where the own elasticity of demand is the same, while the cross elastic-
ity is less than the own elasticity: in this case, the shift down in B’s demand
curve is less than the fall in the price facing A. This implies that the equi-
librium price of imports from A will fall relative to the price of imports
from B when the quota on A is relaxed. In the cross section, then, binding
quotas will be associated with higher prices. Note, however, that the equi-
librium price diﬀerence across exporters depends on many structural pa-
rameters of demand and supply that are impossible to estimate without a
great deal of information.
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Fig. 11.9 Eﬀects of a quota when imports are perfect substitutes
8. Technical point: the importer is indiﬀerent between buying from A or B at any price, so
assume an inﬁnitesimally lower price from A to close the model.What about nonbinding quotas? In most models unﬁlled quotas will
have no eﬀect, and the equilibrium is the same as one with no quotas at all.
This theoretical discussion suggests a simple reduced-form model for
the eﬀect of quotas on import prices:
(2) ln pict    i    c    t    1 ln(1    ict)    2 ln(1   ﬁllrateict) 
   3bindingict   εict
In equation (2), the  s are product-, country-, and year-ﬁxed eﬀects. The
slope coeﬃcients   measure the eﬀects of
(1)  ict (ad valorem trade barriers, including tariﬀs and transport costs); 
(2) ﬁllrateict (the proportion of a quota that is used. By deﬁnition, the ﬁll
380 Carolyn L. Evans and James Harrigan
Fig. 11.10 Eﬀects of a quota when imports are imperfect substitutesrate for ﬂow not subject to a quota is zero [since the implicit quota is inﬁ-
nite]); and (3) bindingict (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the quota is bind-
ing).
A drawback of equation (2) is that it imposes constant coeﬃcients across
products and years. Our data has enough cross-sectional variability to
make year-by-year estimation feasible, so we also estimate
(3) ln pict    it    ct    1t ln(1    ict)    2t ln(1   ﬁllrateict) 
   3tbindingict   εict
While equations (2) and (3) are nonstructural, theory does give some sug-
gestions about the interpretation of the slope coeﬃcients.  1 summarizes
how free on board (f.o.b.) import prices respond to ad valorem trade bar-
riers and is expected to be negative to the extent that the United States has
market power. If nonbinding quotas don’t have any eﬀect,  2 is likely to be
zero, given that the eﬀect of binding quotas is measured by  3.
A problem with estimating equations (2) and (3) is that we do not have
true price data and must make do with unit values instead. Unit values are
constructed from the raw data by dividing the value of shipments by the
physical quantity of imports (usually measured by “dozens” in the case of
apparel). Unit values in a given category can diﬀer across exporters even if
identical goods have identical prices everywhere, to the extent that the
composition of exports within a category diﬀers by source country. The
theory of “quality upgrading” suggests that binding quotas induce higher
unit values, in which case  3   0 may measure quality diﬀerences rather
than quota rents (see Feenstra, forthcoming, chap. 8).
Table 11.4 shows the results of estimating equations (2) and (3). We re-
port both ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS)
estimates, with the weights given by import values. We focus here on the
WLS results.
The column headed “barriers” suggests that the United States does in-
deed have market power in apparel, with a signiﬁcantly negative elasticity
of import prices with respect to ad valorem barriers in most years. Inter-
estingly, the eﬀect seems to have declined over time, with an elasticity of –
0.5 at the beginning of the sample and only –0.06 by 1998.
Binding quotas had a sizable impact on prices, with an overall eﬀect of
6.3 percentage points. Between 1990 and 1996, the quota eﬀect was on the
order of 5–10 percentage points, an eﬀect which jumped to 24 in the “Asia
Crisis” year of 1997 before becoming slightly negative in the recovery year
of 1998. This anomalous behavior may be due to the fact that two of the
largest quota-constrained exporters, China and Hong Kong, did not de-
value in 1997, while other countries did.
Controlling for whether a quota is binding, the ﬁll rate has no eﬀect, as
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the ﬁll rate as a regressor in the year-by-year regressions.9
Our results suggest that eﬀect of quotas on prices is a step function: for
ﬁll rates between zero and 90 percent, the eﬀect is zero, and for ﬁll rates
above 90 the eﬀect is constant. This is the right speciﬁcation only if quotas
bind precisely when ﬁll rates hit 90 percent but not before or after. To check
this we estimated versions of equation (2) that included dummies for ﬁll
rates in the intervals [80,85), [85,90), [90,95), and [95,100]. The results sug-
gests that quotas start to bind at ﬁll rates of around 85 percent and that the
price eﬀect is constant between 85 percent and 100 percent.10However, the
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Table 11.4 Price eﬀects
OLS Weighted LS
Barriers Quota Fill rate Barriers Quota Fill rate
1990–198 –0.241 0.102 0.000 –0.016 0.063 –0.003
–29.0 5.1 0.0 –2.7 14.2 –1.9
1990 –0.395 0.205 –0.504 0.108
–11.2 3.1 –8.5 7.5
1991 –0.302 0.104 –0.212 0.053
–10.4 2.0 –3.9 4.0
1992 –0.235 0.097 –0.390 0.054
–8.1 1.8 –9.2 4.2
1993 –0.211 0.133 –0.343 0.065
–9.1 2.4 –11.9 5.0
1994 –0.266 0.159 –0.179 0.096
–10.4 3.0 –7.8 6.6
1995 –0.303 0.057 –0.182 0.076
–11.2 1.1 –7.9 5.5
1996 –0.257 0.080 –0.062 0.088
–9.1 1.5 –2.9 6.2
1997 –0.264 0.115 0.010 0.242
–9.6 2.2 0.5 18.5
1998 –0.264 0.129 –0.060 –0.034
–10.6 2.6 –2.8 –2.5
Notes: Dependent variable is log unit value of imports into the United States by exporter,
product, and year. See text for deﬁnitions of regressors. All regressions include exporter and
product ﬁxed eﬀects, and ﬁrst row regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects. For weighted least
squares, the weights are import values. t-statistics in italics.
9. This result is not surprising, but it does cast doubt on the results of Krishna and Tan
(1998). They ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of ﬁll rate on import prices but fail to control for whether
the quota is binding.
10. In particular, the coeﬃcient on the indicator for the [80,85) interval is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, while the other intervals are all signiﬁcantly positive. In addition, an F-
test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the [85,90), [90,95), and [95,100] in-
tervals are equal.results from assuming that quotas bind at a ﬁll rate of 85 percent are not
materially diﬀerent from the results reported in table 11.4.
What do these results imply about the level of quota rents? It is impos-
sible to answer this question with any conﬁdence, as our statistical model
is nonstructural, but a back of the envelope calculation is instructive. Us-
ing the overall WLS binding quota eﬀect of 6.3 percent and multiplying by
the aggregate quantity of quota-constrained imports between 1990 and
1998 ($106.5 billion) gives an estimate of quota rents of $6.71 billion. This
is almost surely a lower bound on the cost of the MFA for U.S. apparel con-
sumers, as the elimination of quotas would likely reduce world prices.
11.6 Conclusions
The 1990s had both good and bad news for East Asian apparel ex-
porters. Their overall exports to the United States increased, at least partly
due to trade liberalization in the form of reduced tariﬀs and expanded quo-
tas. But both discriminatory trade policy (NAFTA and the CBI) and tech-
nological change (which made proximity to the U.S. market more valuable)
conspired against East Asia, leading to a loss of market share to Mexico
and the Caribbean. As trade continues to liberalize, trade policy may cease
to be an advantage for exporters near the U.S. market, but their geograph-
ical advantage will persist. This suggests that even when the MFA is ﬁnally
phased out, trade patterns are unlikely to return to where they were before
NAFTA and the CBI.
The MFA continued to substantially distort trade even after the found-
ing of the WTO. We ﬁnd that MFA quotas tightly constrained many East
Asian exporters and led to substantially higher import prices in the United
States. A rough calculation suggests that MFA quotas yielded many bil-
lions of dollars in quota rents to holders of quota licenses.
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Table 11A.1 Binding quota incidence and market share by commodity
Percent binding
Commodity Market  share, 
Description no. 1991 1998 1998
M&B knit shirts, cotton 338 66 58 10.7
M&B cot. trousers/breeches/shorts 347 56 35 10.4
W&G cotton trousers/slacks/shorts 348 63 30 8.4
W&G knit shirts/blouses, cotton 339 48 60 7.4
M&B cotton shirts, not knit 340 71 54 6.4
W&G mmf. knit shirts and blouses 639 64 86 4.9
Other M&B mmf. coats 634 79 43 3.5
W&G mmf. coats 635 54 28 3.2
M&B mmf. trousers/breeches/shorts 647 69 64 3.1
M&B mmf. knit shirts 638 55 70 3
W&G cot. shirts/blouses, non-knit 341 47 71 2.6
Mmf. dresses 636 59 32 2.6
W&G mmf. slacks/breeches/shorts 648 66 62 2.3
Other mmf. apparel 659 38 22 2.3
Other cotton apparel 359 46 17 1.8
W&G not-knit mmf. shirts and blouses 641 60 43 1.8
W&G sweaters, wool 446 64 56 1.6
W&G mmf. sweaters 646 6 47 1.6
W&G wool coats 435 29 11 1.5
Mmf. skirts 642 30 40 1.4
Sweaters, other non-cot. veg. ﬁbers 845 85 73 1.3
Cotton sweaters 345 49 68 1.2
M&B not-knit mmf. shirts 640 38 27 1.1
Cotton dresses 336 47 51 1
W&G not-knit silk shirts and blouses 741 0 0 1
Mmf. hosiery 632 48 0 0.9
W&G silk knit shirts and blouses 739 0 0 0.9
M&B suit-type coats, wool 433 5 6 0.8
Cotton hosiery 332 12 2 0.7
Wool knit shirts/blouses 438 3 61 0.7
M&B sweaters, wool 445 27 43 0.7
Trousers/breeches/shorts, silk and veg. 847 67 56 0.7
Cotton skirts 342 31 32 0.6
M&B wool trousers/breeches/shorts 447 19 8 0.6
W&G wool slacks/breeches/shorts 448 31 14 0.6
Non-knit shirts and blouses, silk and veg. 840 24 43 0.6
W&G cotton coats 335 46 26 0.5
W&G silk coats 735 0 0 0.4
Silk dresses 736 0 0 0.4
Knit shirts and blouses, silk and veg. 838 30 37 0.4
Other M&B coats, cotton 334 48 16 0.3
Wool skirts 442 31 12 0.3
M&B mmf. suit-type coats 633 19 10 0.3
M&B mmf. sweaters 645 3 17 0.3
M&B mmf. down-ﬁlled coats 653 58 71 0.3References
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Table 11A.1 (continued)
Percent binding
Commodity Market  share, 
Description no. 1991 1998 1998
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Silk neckwear 758 0 0 0.2
Skirts, silk and veg. blends 842 5 9 0.2
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M&B silk knit shirts 738 0 0 0.1
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Comment Leonard K. Cheng
This is an interesting empirical study of the eﬀects of protectionist mea-
sures as represented by both tariﬀs and quotas on U.S. apparel imports,
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University of Science and Technology.with a particular focus on imports from East Asia. The tariﬀs reﬂect the re-
sults of nondiscriminatory global trade liberalization as well as discrimi-
natory regional trade liberalization, whereas the quotas are those under
the Multiﬁber Arrangement (MFA). Many researchers have talked about
the MFA, a complex system of bilateral quotas, but few have taken the time
and eﬀort to examine what the “quota ﬁll rates” (i.e., the extent to which
quotas were actually binding) were like, how the ﬁll rates evolved over time,
and how the quotas with diﬀerent ﬁll rates aﬀected the prices of U.S. ap-
parel imports.
The paper’s four main ﬁndings pertain to (a) the constraints of MFA
quotas (as measured by their ﬁll rates) faced by diﬀerent apparel exporters;
(b) the eﬀects of discriminatory regional trade liberalization on exports
from East Asia versus exports from Mexico and the Caribbean; (c) the im-
pact of geographical distance; and (d) the impact of MFA quotas on free
on board (f.o.b.) prices paid by the United States for its apparel imports.
None of them is very surprising, but it is reassuring to obtain them from
the empirical data and through hypothesis testing. I would like to congrat-
ulate the authors for their rich factual ﬁndings and interesting results from
hypothesis testing.
One ﬁnding is that “China and Hong Kong are the largest exporters of
both constrained and unconstrained imports, while the smaller exporters
(Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines) seem to have their
exports very tightly capped by MFA quotas” (chap. 11 in this volume). In-
deed, table 11.2 shows that the percentage of imports under binding quota
in 1998 was 99 percent for Indonesia, markedly higher than that for the
other East Asian exporters. (However, contrary to the preceding state-
ment, the percentage for Singapore was zero!) Was it because the smaller
exporters were given small quota growth rates than the bigger exporters?
Or was it because the cost structures in 1998 of the formerly competitive
exporters like Hong Kong made them uncompetitive? Was the initial quota
of Indonesia small because it was a latecomer in the export of apparels so
that the same quota growth rates like other exporters simply was not
enough to exploit fully its cost advantage? It seems diﬃcult to understand
why China, presumably a low-cost production site, had only 57 percent of
binding quotas in 1998. What were the reasons? Did it have anything to do
with antidumping threats or shifts in commodity composition? It would be
helpful if the authors could answer these questions.
The authors tested the relevance and importance of geographical dis-
tance as a determinant of exports of apparels that are subject to “rapid re-
plenishment”—a form of just-in-time delivery in global supply chains. The
variables used to explain the growth of imports of diﬀerent products from
diﬀerent exporters included (a) product and country dummies, (b) change
in ad valorem tariﬀrates, (c) distance dummy multiplied by the percentage
of rapid replenishment products, and (d) distance dummy multiplied by
Tight Clothing: How the MFA Aﬀects Asian Apparel Exports 387the value-to-weight ratio. I am glad the authors are able to use the last vari-
able to implement my earlier suggestion to consider the availability of air
freight as a counterweight to geographical proximity for high value (per-
unit weight) products. Besides having the right signs, the two coeﬃcients
for distance and the value-weight ratio are both statistically and economi-
cally signiﬁcant.
In conducting the preceding test, the authors used only observations
where quotas were not binding. That is a clever way to exclude quotas from
their estimation equation. However, I suspect the reader would not be com-
pletely satisﬁed because the impact of quota constraints on exports re-
mains unanswered. It would be great if the authors can ﬁnd some ways to
answer this question. For instance, can they use the estimation equation
obtained in the preceding manner to predict the growth of U.S. imports of
the excluded observations (which by deﬁnition are quota constrained) and
then examine whether the prediction errors vary systematically with the
degree of quota constraints or, better still, estimate the eﬀects of quotas
from the prediction errors?
The second hypothesis testing was about the determinants of f.o.b. prices
received by diﬀerent suppliers of apparel products to the United States. The
determinants included were (a) product, country, and time dummies, (b)
tariﬀ rate, (c) quota ﬁll rate, and (d) a dummy variable for binding quotas.
Two models of demand and supply (namely, one for homogeneous products
and the other for diﬀerentiated products) were developed to generate hy-
potheses about the eﬀect of quotas on f.o.b. prices, exports by diﬀerent sup-
pliers, and their market shares. The adopted estimation equation seems to
have rejected the model of homogeneous products, which predicts that “any
change in the level of the quota will have no eﬀect on price” (chap. 11 in this
volume) so long as there are other suppliers besides the supplier with a
quota constraint. However, the adopted estimation equation is indeed not
inconsistent with the homogeneous products model if B’s supply curve is
upward sloping. Under this last condition, an increase in A’s quota would
lead to a decrease of the price of the homogeneous product supplied by both
A and B. The authors perhaps should soften their conclusion in the case of
homogeneous products that “any change in the level of the quota will have
no eﬀect on price” (chap. 11 in this volume).
The following are two minor issues to point out. First, the authors are
aware that the coeﬃcient of the binding quota dummy captures both the
supply restriction eﬀect of binding quotas and the quality upgrading eﬀect
brought about by such quotas. They should note that the quality upgrad-
ing eﬀect may invalidate their conclusion that the estimated “quota rents
of $6.71 billion . . . is almost surely a lower bound on the cost of the MFA
for U.S. apparel consumers” (chap. 11 in this volume). Second, they inter-
pret “rapid replenishment” as a technological change. I am not sure that is
the most appropriate interpretation. I personally would prefer to interpret
388 Carolyn L. Evans and James Harriganit as a change in demand or, more speciﬁcally, an increase in demand for
fashion goods, that is, goods with a short shelf life.
To sum up, I enjoyed reading this very interesting and informative paper
and have learned a lot from it. I commend the authors for their useful con-
tribution to the literature on the MFA, global and regional trade liberal-
ization, and location advantages.
Comment Philippa Dee
I very much enjoyed the paper—empirical work is essential if we are to un-
derstand the trade eﬀects and welfare consequences of nontariﬀ measures
such as the Multiﬁber Arrangement (MFA). My comments are of two
types—technical comments and comments on the policy “bottom line.”
The main technical point is on the role of rapid replenishment. Clearly
this has been part of the revolution in textiles and clothing over the last
decade. But the paper assumes in its functional form that rapid replenish-
ment is only a factor in countries such as Mexico and the Caribbean, which
are geographically close to the United States. But it is not clear that its role
is so restricted. The chief executive oﬃcers (CEOs) of Hong Kong textile
companies describe themselves as being, not in the textile and clothing
business, but in the supply chain management business. The key to this is
logistics, and logistics is only partly geography.
These Hong Kong–based CEOs also state that Mexico is competitive on
a narrow range of goods that meet the U.S. rules of origin but that else-
where it is not competitive. Why is this, when shipping delays clearly work
in Mexico’s favor? The minimum shipping times are three days from Mex-
ico, compared with twelve days from Hong Kong and ﬁfteen days from
China, a deﬁnite advantage for Mexico in clothing, where a product cycle
can last as little as forty-ﬁve days.
The answer lies in the ability of Hong Kong supply chain managers to
cover the entire product chain, from design onward, and to shepherd a
product from sample making to delivery in just three weeks. In doing so,
they may divide the production and sourcing process into as many as ten
or twelve stages across the whole Asian region, reconﬁguring its architec-
ture for each new order. And with this extent of value added, they ﬁnd it a
small cost to air freight the ﬁnal product.
According to interviews, availability of MFA quotas no longer ﬁgures
prominently in the production and sourcing decisions of these Hong Kong
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Productivity Commission.CEOs (Spinanger and Verma 2003). Instead, the key factors are politics
and stability in the host country; quality of transport infrastructure in the
host country; quality of telecommunications infrastructure in the host
country; policies (other than quotas) aﬀecting international trade and in-
vestment; labor costs; policies aﬀecting labor, health, and the environment;
and lack of restrictions on capital and proﬁts transactions. Prominent in
this list are factors that aﬀect the ability of the CEOs to meet the demands
of rapid replenishment. Therefore, I would like to see the rapid replenish-
ment variable applied to all countries in the sample, not just those that are
geographically close to the United States. Distance also matters, but its
eﬀects are probably adequately controlled for by the country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
In the model of how quotas aﬀect prices, it is good to see the use of both
perfect competition and imperfect competition models. But it is not clear
that rents from MFA quotas have always ﬂowed to exporters, given the
monopsony buying power of companies like Karstadt in Germany or Wal-
mart in the United States. And if importers are sharing the rents, then quo-
tas will have a price impact even in a perfectly competitive supply situation.
The eﬀects of quotas on prices will be aﬀected more generally by supply
side factors in general equilibrium. These eﬀects can be worked out in a
structural model of the textile and clothing sector. Yang (1994) is an early
example of such work.
The price eﬀects are estimated econometrically using weighted least
squares. A further technical point is whether import values are the right
weights. The concern is similar to concerns about the use of import weights
for tariﬀ averaging. In both cases, the lowest weights can be given to situa-
tions where trade barriers are most tightly binding. In any event, the
weighted least squares estimates are very volatile.
A policy bottom line of the paper is that the geographical advantage of
Mexico will persist so that even when the MFA is phased out, trade pat-
terns will not return to where they were before NAFTA. But the available
evidence suggests this may not be the case. Even in the two years beyond
1998, where the paper’s sample ends, the trade shares into the United States
turned against Mexico and back to China and Hong Kong. The paper by
Spinanger and Verma (2003) also gives several cogent examples of where
the sourcing of textiles and clothing from China has changed quickly and
dramatically in response to changing quotas elsewhere.
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